It’s not meant for subscription users; the subscriptions are just the gateway drug to Enterprise pricing which Anthropic intends to use to juice their numbers before IPO.
Darwin namespaces would be much more interesting and we are in dire need of them in the current security landscape.
I don’t really understand the hype for Apple’s Containerization, it’s just another container runtime alongside many others. It’s not really any better than OrbStack - in fact it’s worse.
When Apple Sherlocks something, aren't their implementations usually worse? Typically the thing being Sherlock'd is very mature and featureful, and Apple's implementation is much less capable and has undergone much less user testing, at least at the outset.
My employer is all in on Anthropic via Enterprise (API) pricing despite it being a total scam.
Last month I pushed like <100M tokens for $800. On a personal project I pushed 600M tokens via DeepSeek V4 for $10. The pricing of SOTA models is insane but companies are still willing to light money on fire with no hard metrics proving increased productivity.
They already have though, no? If we lost access to every model permanently besides Qwen tomorrow, would we really be limited by AI in what we could achieve in the future? Sure, it might be slower and take a little more work but it seems like the cat is already out of the bag.
It is an access issue. If you could get step by step instructions on how to modify a virus so it kills all people over 6ft you bet your ass there would be people attempting it.
Column A, Column B. Building a small explosive device isn't hard. Building a million is very difficult, doing it covertly virtually impossible without the resources of a nation-state.
The problem with biologics is the self-assembly and replication machinery comes for "free." So the numpties who might otherwise blow up a trash can [1] now have a real chance of taking out a million people.
They would still have to procure things that would (I hope) light up many screens before they're able to. And such numpties are probably already monitored, or in prison for some other stupid life decision.
I also would like to hope that people that are likely to do such things are probably:
A) don't know how to break even the most basic guardrails of models
> They would still have to procure things that would (I hope) light up many screens before they're able to
“Many of the largest and most responsible providers in the industry already screen and record orders voluntarily,” but there is no requirement to do so [1].
If that were possible, they would already be attempting it with the same level of ability as if they didn’t have access to a text file generator app. It is not about access to the information.
All of this “guardrails” handwringing is nonsense. These things output text. Are you for censorship of a book written by a biotechnology expert that gives out the exact same information?
I don’t know if you’re being silly but it is orders of magnitudes easier to modify an existing virus to selectively target certain snps than make “antiviral nanobots”
Claude, modify the existing 6ft killer virus so that it only makes my balls itch slightly for a day and gives me lifetime immunity to all further stamms of the 6ft killer virus. Make no mistakes, double check so the virus causes no unforseen complications.
It's inevitable. Also, it's not like I get to vet who does or doesn't have access. Blind trust in the current selection made by an unregulated corporation just makes me anxious.
Security in the form of "pay to play" is just kicking the bigger issue down the road.
The argument against security through obscurity isn't that it doesn't work at all. It does to a degree, only it is not as strong as people think.
An example from the meat world: not publishing your vacation dates well in advance for the world to see somewhat reduces your chance of being burglarized. That is security by obscurity; not reliable, but not completely inefficient either.
But if you live in a fortress (security by key material), you can well declare your vacation dates without running the risk.
It the tool was made available to anyone to build a virus, anyone would be able to build counter measures, if only a select few people have access they get to build the virus and everyone else is at a disadvantage. So, yes, I am leaning towards making these tools open rather than gated behind some priesthood and government that gets to wield exclusive power.
Compare the cost/ease of attacker vs defender if one person is given a virus to unleash anywhere in the world and another person is given a vaccine to distribute to the whole world. Or compare building a large bridge to someone disabling that bridge, etc. Prevention and repair is almost always more expensive than vandalism.
I don't think there's an ideal solution here, but giving trusted people access to fix security issues before giving it to the wider public seems like a reasonable compromise. They're letting you use the model for all other uses.
you need a lot more than the nucleotide sequence to make a virus. you need the DNA or RNA to be synthesized, assembled, packaged properly. and long sequences are pretty hard to do. you need a lot of equipment, or you need to order from services. the oligo synth services can harden their KYC and/or screen for suspicious sequences.
sure, a malevolent state actor could swing it, but they could make a bioweapon without Mythos's help already.
also, vaccine production and disease surveillance have ramped up very quickly. they will ramp up further, despite political setbacks. it's a cat and mouse game that favors the defenders IMO.
but the bioterrorism narrative is useful FUD to spin open-weight models as existentially dangerous. I am far more worried about Anthropic's own goals than the goals of some crackpot in a shed.
> it's a cat and mouse game that favors the defenders IMO
How so? I'm actually against most of the "safety-tuning" that anthropic does, but this seems fundamentally untrue, a close analogue being video game cheat development. I think in general the cheat developer has an advantage and the cheats generally proliferate for quite a while before being patched.
Video games are an interesting analogy since they often trade security for performance, trusting clients about world state quite a bit.
Finance and biology do come across as two similar high level systems. But while we can employ KYC, fraud detection, and various auditing techniques to finance, I don’t know what you do for biology. You can easily run an algorithm over every transaction a person makes in their account but there’s no equivalent for every cell, every bacteria strain, every virus in the human body.
(disclaimer: layperson remembering how the immune system works.)
the adaptive immune system effectively does KYC by checking the antigens presented on the surfaces of cells. the thymus selects for B-cells (iirc?) which don't react to a corpus of the body's own antigens, but cover a wide library of everything else. when it sees something it doesn't recognize, it reproduces, warns the rest of the immune system and marks targets. that's why our immune systems can eventually conquer almost every pathogen we encounter, if we can survive long enough for it to do its work.
but the KYC I was referring to was KYC that vendors of oligonucleotides (should) be doing, to keep people from ordering nefarious sequences.
I'm bullish on mRNA vaccine technology to release the "patches" much more quickly. there was widespread resistance to this during covid, but covid wasn't horribly lethal. if airborne Ebola spread as productively as covid, for example, I doubt there'd be many anti-vaxxers left (one way or another!) the acceleration of biology research that might accelerate pathogen development should also accelerate the development of broad-spectrum mRNA vaccines with high persistence.
also, afaik the most effective way of developing pathogens is through serial passage through humanized mice or something like that - directed evolution at a small scale, selecting for traits. AI simply isn't needed for that. I don't think information or intelligence has been the bottleneck for bioterrorism, it's motivation and resources - same as for any other kind of biology research program.
IIRC 4chan was indirectly responsible for his death. An anon bought him a drum kit and Terry annoyed his parents with it, to the point that there was a heated argument and I believe violence. After that, they kicked him out of the house and gave him a van to live in. That’s when he started to really spiral and how he eventually ended up sleeping rough.
I had a stint with VM gaming over Christmas but gave up after wasting too much time trying to bypass anti-cheat detection. My desire came from security concerns; games have a massive attack surface and running them on bare metal makes me uncomfortable. I've always wanted an ephemeral Windows environment for gaming, but it's too much effort to make it work.
I run CachyOS on my gaming PC now and I'm pretty happy with it.
GitHub discussions used to be so much higher quality though when the platform was for professionals. Now, I see so many discussions that devolve into practically being reddit/4chan threads. Another reason to leave.
I wish HN would ban posting links to issue trackers with comment sections, like lobsters has done. Although the spam volume from HN and reddit is pretty small compared to that from youtube reaction video influencers
I feel like it's gotten more professional. 10+ years ago people were dropping the hard R in pull request reviews, now everyone is acting like LinkedIn-speak and Stars will get them their next job
Yeah, that's the Linus "hard R" (he thought "hard R" referred to "retard"), but it's just wrong. "Hard R" is "nigger", in opposition to soft r ("nigga"). I don't think there's even a question, that's how hard/soft has always been used. Anything else is just confusion, I think.
The software experience of AliPay and the other Chinese apps is absolutely terrible. My admiration for super apps quickly declined after actually using them.
The E2EE claim is BS, unless qualified by saying that the platform supports GPG-encrypted emails only. Proton makes the same claim and it’s just completely false. E2EE is not possible with existing email protocols.
The main point they try to make is that once emails land, the platform itself can't read them because they immediately encrypt it with your key, of course, this process is impossible to know for sure. And of course, using PGP or whatever is already a secure medium on all email providers, nothing to really solve here.
Even as some says, even if Cure53 or whatever respectable company does an audit, it still guarantees nothing. Only real way today is with Enclave with proper implementation of attestation and more, anything running server-side can't be checked.
It's quite disappointing that we find many good developers today that still trust ToS of a service as if it was any form of real security, it worth nothing outside of the legal aspect, ToS has nothing to do with code.
reply